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HEALTH CARE LAW
Steven D. Gravely*
I.

OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION

The health care industry continued its dynamic course in late
1991 and early 1992. Feeding the frenzy of activity were the Virginia General Assembly and the judiciary. This article focuses on
key legislative, regulatory, and judicial events of the past year, and
examines their effect on health care in Virginia.
II.

CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC NEED

The General Assembly substantially amended the Virginia Certificate of Public Need (COPN) statute during the 1992 Session.'
These amendments reimpose the requirement of COPN review on
*

Shareholder and Director, Mezzullo & McCandlish, P.C., Richmond, Virginia; B.A.,

1977, College of William and Mary; M.H.A., 1980, Medical College of Virginia, Virginia
Commonwealth University; J.D., 1983, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond. Mr. Gravely concentrates his practice on the representation of health care clients,
specifically hospitals, long term care facilities, physicians and other health care providers.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Lisa R. Foeman, University of Virginia
Law School, Class of 1994, in the research and preparation of initial drafts of portions of
this article.
1. The Certificate of Public Need (COPN) statute, now codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1102.1 to -102.11 (Repl. Vol. 1992), was initially passed in 1982. Act of Apr. 10, 1982, ch. 388,
1982 Va. Acts 634. The COPN program creates a regulatory framework through which the
State Health Commissioner determines the public need for a proposed health care service.
Under the terms of the statute, any individual or entity proposing any "medical care facility
project," as defined in the statute, must obtain administrative agency approval. Current
regulations require applicants to submit an extensive application which describes in detail
all aspects of the proposed project including: ownership; type of project; space plans and
drawings; staffing; capital expenditures; method of financing; and the need for the proposed
expenditure. The Department of Health is permitted to require additional information
before accepting a project for review. See 8:23 Va. Regs. Reg. 4203 (Aug. 10, 1992). The
application undergoes an extensive review process which consists of a public hearing, review
by regional health planning agencies, review by the Commissioner's staff and, usually, an
evidentiary hearing. Id. at 4207-08. The Commissioner's decision on an application is a
"case decision" entitling an aggrieved applicant to judicial review. Id. at 4210; see VA. CODE
ANN. § 32.1-102.6 (Repl. Vol. 1992); VA. SuP. CT. R. 2A:2.
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many activities which had been deregulated and also require review for the first time for a variety of undertakings by physicians.2
COPN review for most capital expenditures, except those associated with the establishment of a new medical care facility or the
addition of beds, and for the establishment of all except certain
specific enumerated services, was eliminated by the General Assembly during its 1989 Session.' To proponents of the 1992 COPN
initiative, increased costs to the Commonwealth and the public
from the alleged proliferation of medical care technology and the
expansion of existing medical care facilities that had occurred since
the "deregulation" of capital projects in 1989 justified reimposing
COPN review. By significantly expanding the definition of a reviewable "project" and thereby increasing the number of activities
requiring COPN review, the General Assembly has changed the focus in Virginia from one of deregulation to one of regulation for
capital expenditures and new services by medical care providers.
A reviewable "project" now includes the initiation of a variety of
health services, the addition of operating rooms, the acquisition or
replacement of a broad range of diagnostic technology such as CT
and MRI scanners, and any capital expenditure in excess of
$1,000,000 which is made "by or in behalf of" a medical care facility, as well as the establishment of a medical care facility or the
addition of beds which have always required a COPN.4
2. Act of Apr. 1, 1992, ch. 612, 1992 Va. Acts 883 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-102.1,
-102.3:2, -102.11 (Repl. Vol. 1992)); Act of Apr. 3, 1992, ch. 682, 1992 Va. Acts 1003 (codified
at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-102.3:2, -102.4 (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
3. Act of March 23, 1989, ch. 517, 1989 Va. Acts 752.
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992). "Project" is defined as:
1. Establishment of a medical care facility;
2. An increase in the total number of beds or operating rooms in an existing medical
care facility;
3. Relocation at the same site of ten beds or ten percent of the beds, whichever is less,
from one existing physical facility to another in any two-year period; however, a hospital shall not be required to obtain a certificate for the use of ten percent of its beds
as nursing home beds as provided in § 32.1-132;
4. Introduction into an existing medical care facility of any new nursing home service,
such as intermediate care facility services, extended care facility services, or skilled
nursing facility services, regardless of the type of medical care facility in which those
services are provided;
5. Introduction into an existing medical care facility of any new cardiac catheterization, computed tomographic (CT), gamma knife surgery, lithotripsy, magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI), magnetic source imaging (MSI), medical rehabilitation,
neonatal special care, obstetrical, open heart surgery, positron emission tomographic
(PET) scanning, psychiat[r]ic, organ or tissue transplant service, radiation therapy,
single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT), substance abuse treatment,
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Whether a particular expenditure is made "in behalf of" a medical care facility will depend upon the specific facts of each case.
Correspondence and decisions by the Department of Health since
passage of the 1992 COPN amendments indicate that almost all
expenditures involving a medical care facility in any way will be
deemed
to be an expenditure "on behalf of" the medical care facility.5 The Department has ruled that construction of a medical office building by a private developer on a hospital campus is an expenditure "in behalf of" the hospital due to the use of hospital
property and the fact that the hospital planned to lease space in
the building.' The Department has opined that the "type and location of [a] project and the
nature of the legal entity [involved] are
7
the key considerations."

The determination of whether a particular expenditure is being
made "by or in behalf of" a medical care facility will likely generate considerable controversy. Preliminary indications are that the
Department of Health, not surprisingly, is taking an expansive
view of the statutory language.8 Whether this view is consistent
with the "plain meaning" of the statute remains to be seen.
The 1992 amendments to the COPN statute also expanded the
definition of a "medical care facility" to include any portion of a
or such other specialty clinical services as may be designated by the Board by regulation, which the facility has never provided or has not provided in the previous twelve
months;
6. The addition or replacement by an existing medical care facility of any medical
equipment for the provision of cardiac catheterization, computed tomographic (CT),
gamma knife surgery, lithotripsy, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), magnetic
source imaging (MSI), open heart surgery, positron emission tomographic (PET)
scanning, radiation therapy, single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT),
or other specialized service designated by the Board by regulation; notwithstanding
the above, the Commissioner shall develop regulations providing for the replacement
by a medical care facility of existing medical equipment, which is determined by the
Commissioner to be inoperable or otherwise in need of replacement without requiring
issuance of a certificate of public need; or
7. Any capital expenditure of one million dollars or more, not defined as reviewable in
subdivisions 1 through 6 of this definition, by or in behalf of a medical care facility.
Id.
5. See, e.g., Correspondence from Paul E. Parker, Director, Division of Resources Development, Virginia Department of Health, to Thomas W. McCandlish, Mezzullo & McCandlish, P.C. (July 8, 1992). While the Parker correspondence uses the term "on behalf of,"
there seems to be no practical difference from the statute's use of "in behalf of."
6. See Correspondence from Wendy V. Brown, Health Planning Consultant, Division of
Resources Development, Virginia Department of Health, to Steven D. Gravely, Mezzullo &
McCandlish, P.C. (June 15, 1992).
7. Parker Correspondence, supra note 5, at 1.
8. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
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physician's office involved in the provision of services which would

otherwise now constitute a "project" under the expanded definition of that term.9 This means that, for the first time in Virginia,
the activities of physicians in their private offices may be subject
to COPN review by the State Health Commissioner. Some observers see this as an attempt to "level the playing field" so that physicians are subject to the same regulatory requirements as hospitals
when they undertake similar activities. The General Assembly also
extended the moratorium on nursing home COPNs through June
30, 1994.10 The exemptions to the moratorium remain in effect.11
These amendments took effect on July 1, 1992.12 The statute

does provide for exemptions from the new requirements in specific
circumstances. However, applications for exemption were required
to be filed by August 1, 1992.13 Those who applied for an exemption on or before August 1, 1992 are entitled to administrative review in accordance with the provisions of the Virginia Administrative Process Act. 4 Denial of a request for exemption
is an
15
appealable case decision in accordance with the APA.
Subsequent to enactment of the COPN statute amendments, the
Department of Health undertook a comprehensive revision of the
Virginia State Medical Facilities Plan (SMFP). 16 The SMFP had
been last updated in 1988.11 The revised SMFP, which took effect
on July 10, 1992, adopts more detailed and more stringent standards for approval of COPN applications. Those standards discuss
not only criteria for demonstrating need but also criteria for accessibility, cost, and quality. Compliance with the SMFP is a prerequisite to appeal of a COPN application pursuant to Virginia Code
section 32.1-102.3.18
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.3:2 (Repl. Vol. 1992).

11. Id.
12. Id. § 32.1-102.11(A).
13. Id. § 32.1-102.11(B).
14. Id.; see id. §§ 9-6.14:1 to -6.14:25 (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cur. Supp. 1992).
15. See id. § 9-6.14:4(D) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
16. 8:23 Va. Regs. Reg. 4212-13 (Aug. 10, 1992). Due to the length of the regulation, the
Virginia Register contains a summary of the State Medical Facilities Plan in lieu of the full
text.
17. Id. at 4213.
18. The Code allows the State Health Commissioner to set aside the SMFP in certain
cases. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.3(A) (Repl. Vol 1992). While the Commissioner has set aside
the 1988 SMFP in recent years, this is much less likely now that a new SMFP has been
adopted.
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To implement the changes to the COPN statute, the Department of Health promulgated revisions to the Rules and Regulations Governing the Certificate of Public Need Program (Rules &
Regulations) effective July 10, 1992.'" The revised regulations significantly modify some aspects of the application review processes.
In contrast to the previous rules, which merely required an applicant to file a request for forms before submitting an application,
the current rules require applicants to file a letter of intent regarding a planned COPN application at least thirty (30) days prior to
submission of an application.20 Like the previous rules, the letter
of intent must identify the owner, the type of project, and the proposed scope and location of the project.21
The revised COPN regulations also adopt a "batching" process
for reviewing COPN applications. 22 Under this process, COPN applications for specific health services are grouped together in a
"batched" review cycle. There are only two review cycles each year
for batch groups A-F. Nursing home projects, for which a COPN
moratorium remains in effect, will be reviewed by planning district
with only one review cycle per year for each district.2 3 This change
in the regulations represents a dramatic shift from the previous
rules which reviewed any proposed project for a particular service
on the tenth day of each month, provided the application was complete. Unlike the prior rule, the new regulation affords the Commissioner the opportunity to evaluate all applicants for a particular service at one time, thereby increasing the Commissioner's
ability to assess public need and to perform a more informed cost/
benefit analysis.24
While the proposed batching regulation may promote more effective comparative review of similar applications, it poses special
problems for applicants. By providing for separate review of every
aspect of a project, the rule may cause added expense and delay by
19. Virginia Medical Care Facilities Certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations,
8:23 Va. Regs. Reg. 4195 (Aug. 10, 1992) (effective July 10, 1992) [hereinafter COPN
Regulations].
20. COPN Regulations, 8:23 Va. Regs. Reg. at 4201. Prior COPN regulations required
submission of a letter of intent but the timing of the submission was not critical. See 6:22
Va. Regs. Reg. 3554 (July 30, 1991).
21. COPN Regulations, 8:23 Va. Regs. Reg. at 4201.
22. Id. at 4202-08.
23. Id. at 4203. The seven "batch of groups" are set forth at 8:23 Va. Regs. Reg. 4203-06.
24. 6:22 Va. Regs. Reg. 3550 (July 30, 1990).
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impeding an applicant's ability to wholly plan a project in advance
or by necessitating piecemeal construction of projects.
Another significant change in the revised COPN regulations is a
new section entitled "Requests for Applications." This provision
gives the Commissioner authority to request applications for identified specific needs for services and facilities.25 On a practical
level, this provision demonstrates the Commonwealth's renewed
activist role in the health care arena. This provision could be
promising since it would create incentives for developers to supply
services or build facilities in underserved areas of the state.
The new Rules and Regulations eliminate the reporting and registration requirements for covered projects" and place requests
for emergency replacement of medical equipment outside the definition of "project. '2 7 For the latter, a certificate of need will not be
required.' In addition, standards for determining "emergency replacement" are set out in the new rules.29
The general trend in COPN law is the use of increased regulation as a mechanism to enhance competition in health care. Regulators hope that more competition will lead to decreased costs,
higher quality of service, and improved accessibility to the system.
Examination of the Virginia health care system over the next several years will be crucial in determining whether these changes actually bring about the desired results.

III.

THE CONSOLIDATED OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT

OF 1986 (COBRA)
The Emergency Medical Treatment & Active Labor Act30 was
enacted by Congress in 1986, as part of the 1986 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), in response to a perception that indigent persons with emergency medical conditions
were being denied access to appropriate medical care. The pertinent provisions of COBRA assure access to hospital care for persons who require emergency care or women in active labor.3 1 CO25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

COPN Regulations, 8:23 Va. Regs. Reg. at 4206-07.
Id. at 4200-01.
Id. at 4201-02.
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (Supp. II 1990).
Id.
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BRA applies to hospitals, and perhaps physicians, in the
Commonwealth by virtue of their participation in the Medicare
and Medicaid Program.2
There have been several recent decisions by federal and state
courts in Virginia construing the duty imposed on hospitals by COBRA. The trend in these cases is to expand the ability of plaintiffs
to recover damages under COBRA for adverse medical outcomes.
The COBRA provisions attempt to eliminate alleged "patient
dumping"'3 through three basic provisions. The first provision requires a hospital which has an emergency department and which
participates in the Medicare program to perform, within its capability, a medical screening examination on any individual who
comes to the emergency room requesting treatment.3 4 Second, if a
hospital determines that a hospital patient has an emergency condition or is in active labor,35 the hospital must either stabilize3 6 the
patient or transfer37 the individual to another medical facility.3 8 Fi32. COBRA first became effective August 1, 1986, and was enacted to prevent hospitals
from refusing treatment to or transferring indigent patients with emergency medical conditions, a practice commonly referred to as "patient dumping." Congress sought to eliminate
patient dumping by requiring that any hospital receiving federal funds accept any individual seeking treatment in its emergency room. By law, if the hospital refused, it would risk
the loss of funding. See, e.g., Smith v. Richmond Memorial Hosp., 243 Va. 445, 449, 416
S.E.2d 689, 691 (1992).
33. The phrase "patient dumping" refers to the practice of a hospital transferring a patient, who has an emergency medical condition or who is in active labor, to another hospital
rather than treating the patient. Id.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (Supp. II 1990).
35. Id. § 1395dd(e)(1). "Emergency medical condition" means (a) a medical condition
manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that
the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in (i)
placing the health of the individual or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the health of the
woman or her unborn child, in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to bodily functions,
or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part; or (b) with respect to a pregnant
woman who is having contractions (i) that there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer
to another hospital before delivery, or (ii) that transfer may pose a threat to the health or
safety of the woman or the unborn child. Id.
36. Id. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A). "To stabilize" means to provide medical treatment necessary to
assure, within reasonable medical probability, that no material deterioration of the emergency medical condition or active labor is likely to result or occur during or from the transfer of the individual from a facility. Id.
37. Id. § 1395dd(e)(4). "Transfer" means "the movement (including the discharge) of an
individual outside a hospital's facilities at the direction of any person employed by (or affiliated or associated directly or indirectly with) the hospital, but does not include such a
movement of an individual who (a) has been declared dead; or (b) leaves the facility without
the permission of any such person. Id.
38. Id. § 1395dd(b). A hospital is deemed to satisfy these requirements if the hospital
offers the individual further medical examination and treatment or offers to transfer the
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nally, in the event that the individual is not stabilized, the hospital
may not transfer that individual except in certain limited
circumstances."9
The COBRA provisions raise many troublesome issues. The statute is silent as to who exactly is responsible for medical screening
and determining whether the individual has an emergency medical
condition or is in active labor. Case law suggests that the physician
designated as the "emergency room" physician or covering the obstetrical service at the time bears the ultimate responsibility. However, it is the hospital that is subject to damages and sanctions
under COBRA. Similarly, the medical screening requirement
presents special problems for hospitals and physicians treating
managed care patients. Where the third-party payer has refused to
authorize treatment and reimbursement for care provided, the hospital or physician, by law, still must determine whether the individual presenting to the emergency room has an emergency medical condition. If so, then the hospital is obligated to treat and
either stabilize or transfer, if appropriate, the individual regardless
of method of payment. Likewise, those hospitals that allow private
physicians to come to the emergency room to treat their own patients should be wary of potential lawsuits if a medical screening is
not conducted on a patient upon arrival. Moreover, the issue of to
whom COBRA applies, whether all individuals or only the indigent/uninsured, remains unresolved.40
In Smith v. Richmond Memorial Hospital,4' the Virginia Supreme Court was called upon to evaluate the application of COBRA to a hospital inpatient. Specifically, the issue on appeal related to whether the treatment and transfer provisions of COBRA
are restricted to individuals admitted to an emergency room whose
emergency medical condition or active labor had not been stabiindividual to another medical facility and the individual refuses. The hospital, however, is
required to obtain the individual's (or the individual's agent's) informed consent to refuse.
Id. § 1395dd(b)(2).
39. See id. § 1395dd(c).
40. See ZaiKaner v. Danaher, (D.C. Minn. 1990) CCH Medicare and Medicaid Guide
38999 at 24,966; Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433, 436 (D. Kan. 1990); and Evitt v.
University Heights Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 495, 497 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (all citing the proposition
that the individual must allege economic condition as basis for denial of treatment). But see
Lee v. Alleghany Regional Hosp. Corp., 778 F. Supp. 900, 902 (W.D. Va. 1991) (mem.) and
Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 270 (6th Cir. 1990) (both holding
that claim under COBRA is actionable even if patient does not allege that denial of treatment was based on his/her economic condition).
41. 243 Va. 445, 416 S.E.2d 689 (1992).
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lized, or whether the requirements also apply when an emergency
medical condition or active labor occurred after admission to the
hospital and initial stabilization of the patient's condition."2
In Smith, a woman, thirty-three weeks pregnant at the time, was
admitted to Richmond Memorial Hospital on July 18, 1988, for
premature rupture of the uterine membrane. She remained at the
hospital until July 23, 1988. On July 22, the patient complained of
abdominal cramping and vaginal leakage, and later in the day, contractions. That night, the patient was taken to the labor and delivery suite of the hospital. Still experiencing vaginal discharge complications, the patient was ordered transferred to The Medical
College of Virginia Hospital (MCV) by a physician who had not
examined her. After encountering difficulty obtaining an ambulance service, Richmond Memorial transferred appellant to MCV,
where she gave birth to her daughter by caesarean section. Both
mother and daughter suffered substantial injuries; the daughter
has cerebral palsy and severe brain damage..
The mother sued Richmond Memorial in her individual capacity
and on behalf of her daughter, alleging that her transfer from
Richmond Memorial to MCV while in a medically-unstable condition constituted a violation of COBRA. 4
The hospital demurred on three grounds. First, the hospital argued that the claim was not actionable under COBRA since it was
fundamentally a medical malpractice claim. Second, the hospital
argued that since appellant did not allege that her indigent status
motivated her transfer from Richmond Memorial to MCV, no actionable claim under COBRA was established. Finally, the hospital
argued that no notice of claim was given as required by Virginia
Code section 8.01-581.2."5
The trial court concluded that section 8.01-581.2 did not apply
to claims based on a COBRA violation.4 6 However, the trial court
42. Id. at 450, 416 S.E.2d at 691.
43. Id. at 447-48, 416 S.E.2d at 690.
44. Id. at 448, 416 S.E.2d at 690.
45. Id. Section 8.01-581.2 states in relevant part that "[n]o action may be brought for
malpractice against a health care provider unless the claimant notifies the health care provider in writing by registered or certified mail prior to commencing the action. The written
notification shall include the time of the alleged malpractice and a reasonable description of
the act or acts of malpractice." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
46. Smith, 243 Va. at 448, 416 S.E.2d at 690. On appeal, the court reviewed the hospital's
assignment of cross-error on the notice issue. The court disagreed with the hospital's assertion that the notice of claim provision did not conflict with COBRA since complying with
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agreed that appellant's claim was one for medical malpractice, not
a COBRA violation. Consequently, the trial court held that no actionable claim under COBRA was pleaded since COBRA does not
cover "emergency conditions arising from medical neglect during a
stay in a hospital."4
On appeal, the hospital argued that appellant did not sufficiently
plead a COBRA violation for two reasons. First, the hospital asserted "that coming to an emergency room in an emergency medical condition or in labor is a prerequisite to the application of the
treatment and transfer provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of the
Act. . .. "" Since the appellant did not plead either of the prerequisites, the hospital argued that the claim should fail. Also, the
hospital asserted that COBRA was inapplicable to the situation
since the appellant acknowledged that her condition had been stabilized prior to the event causing the transfer. Second, the hospital
argued that appellant's claim was one for misdiagnosis or improper
4
treatment, neither of which falls within the scope of COBRA. 1
The appellant responded that under the language of the Act, a patient may have a cause of action even if the patient is not transferred from an emergency room. Consequently, appellant argued
that a hospital cannot avoid COBRA liability by "initially stabilizing a patient, allowing the patient to again become unstable and
then transferring the patient." 50
In resolving these issues, the supreme court declined to resort to
rules of statutory construction, stating that the words of the statute were plain and unambiguous. 5 ' Although acknowledging that a
patient must be in an emergency medical condition or in active
labor before subsections (a) and (b) will apply, the court went on
the Virginia statute's notice provision could make an individual ineligible to file a claim
within COBRA's two-year statute of limitations period. Id. at 456, 416 S.E.2d at 695. The
Virginia Code prohibits an individual from filing a medical malpractice claim against a provider until 90 days after notification. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
For a case concerning waiver of the notice provisions found in COBRA, see Layton v.
Kroger Co., 924 F.2d 1052 (4th Cir. 1991).
47. Smith, 243 Va. at 448-49, 416 S.E.2d at 690-91.
48. Id. at 449-50, 416 S.E.2d at 691.
49. Id. at 450, 416 S.E.2d at 691.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 452, 416 S.E.2d at 692. The court declined to address the hospital's second
argument. The hospital admitted that a medical malpractice claim and COBRA claim could
exist simultaneously. Finding that a COBRA claim had been pleaded, the court noted that
whether the COBRA claim in reality was only a traditional malpractice claim is an issue of
fact, not pleading, possibly subject to a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 455 n.3, 416
S.E.2d at 694 n.3.
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to substantially broaden the reach of the statute. The court concluded that the language of COBRA does not limit application of
subsections (b) and (c) only to individuals that initially arrive at
the emergency room and who have not been stabilized.5 2 On the
contrary, the court concluded that the Act extends beyond the
emergency room. Looking to the Act's purpose, prevention of patient dumping, the court agreed that patient dumping is not restricted to a refusal to provide emergency room treatment.5 3
The Virginia federal courts likewise have issued decisions interpreting the language of COBRA. In McIntyre v. Schick, 4 the
plaintiff, who had no health insurance, allegedly came to Virginia
Beach General Hospital (VBGH) on November 1, 1989 at 7:15 p.m.
"with labor contractions, persistent sinuso'idal fetal heart patterns
and lack of fetal beat-to-beat variability." Plaintiff remained at the
hospital for eleven hours and twenty-five minutes before being formally admitted. The plaintiff contended that the hospital required
admission of patients after a twelve-hour stay, and that this policy
resulted in Mrs. McIntyre's negligent discharge on November 2,
1989, at 6:40 a.m. Later that night, plaintiff, allegedly suffering
from the same condition, returned to VBGH where Dr. Schick ordered her transferred to Norfolk General Hospital. There, she delivered an anemic baby boy by caesarian section. The infant died a
few days later. 5
Plaintiff's complaint alleged several violations of COBRA. First,
plaintiff alleged defendants Schick and VBGH violated COBRA by
discharging plaintiff before she was stabilized to avoid admitting
her to the hospital because she had no health insurance. 56 Second,
plaintiff asserted that defendants violated COBRA when they
52. Id. at 454, 416 S.E.2d at 693-94.
53. Id. at 452, 416 S.E.2d at 692; see Thompson v. St. Anne's Hosp., 716 F. Supp. 8 (N.D.
Ill. 1989). See also Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990); Loss
v. Song, No. 89C6952, 1990 WL 159612 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 1990) (mem).
54. No. 2:91cv680 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9008, 1992 WL 134713 (E.D. Va. June 16, 1992).
55. Id. at *2-*3, 1992 WL 134713 at *1.
56. Id. at *5, 1992 WL 134713 at *2; see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395dd(b), (c) (West 1992). Subsection (b) provides that when a hospital determines that an individual has an emergency
medical condition, the hospital must either stabilize the condition or transfer the individual
to a medical facility with the resources to stabilize the condition. Subsection (c) provides
that a hospital may not transfer an individual with an unstabilized emergency medical condition unless (i) the individual makes an informed, written request for a transfer; (ii) a
physician certifies that the benefits of the transfer outweigh the risks; or (iii) another qualified medical person signs such a certification and that persons signature is countersigned by
a consulting physician. Id.
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transferred her to Norfolk General without obtaining the necessary
signed certification of a physician.5" On a motion to dismiss this
count for failure to state a claim, defendants contended that COBRA required plaintiff to plead that she came to the emergency
department of the hospital."'
Although agreeing that a plaintiff would have to seek care at a
hospital's emergency room in order to state a claim under subsection (a) of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd, the court denied the motion to
dismiss the count since plaintiffs pleaded their case under subsections (b) and (c) of that section. In reaching this conclusion, the
court noted that the language of § 1395dd does not require every
provision of the statute to be read in conjunction with subsection
(a). The court reiterated that neither subsection (b) nor (c) refer
59
back to subsection (a). "

Like the Smith court, this court interpreted COBRA's language
broadly, concluding that COBRA does not apply solely to persons
initially coming to the emergency room. 60 Specifically, the court

noted that "nowhere do subsections (b) and (c) state that an individual in an emergency medical condition or in active labor must
enter through the emergency room." 1 Nor must an individual in
another hospital department first be sent to the emergency room
57. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9008 at *6-*7, 1992 WL 134713 at *2. 42 U.S.C.A. §
1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii) (West 1992) states:
[i]f an individual at a hospital has an emergency medical condition which has not
been stabilized . . ., the hospital may not transfer the individual unless a physician
...has signed a certification that based upon the information available at the time
of transfer, the medical benefits reasonably expected from the provision of appropriate medical treatment at another medical facility outweigh the increased risks to the
individual and, in the case of labor, to the unborn child from effecting the
transfer. ...
Id.
58. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9008 at *8, 1992 WL 134713 at *2. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)
(West 1992) states that:
In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if any individual
(whether or not eligible for benefits under this subchapter) comes to the emergency
department and a request is made on the individual's behalf for examination or treatment for a medical condition, the hospital must provide for an appropriate medical
screening examination within the capability of the hospital's emergency department
. . .to determine whether or not an emergency medical condition . . . exists.
Id.
59. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9008 at *9, 1992 WL 134713 at *2.
60. Id.
61. Id. at *10, 1992 WL 134713 at *2.
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for an examination in order to state a claim under subsections (b)
62
and (c).
In Petrovics v. Prince William Hospital Corp.,6 the court focused attention on the medical screening requirement of COBRA.
In Petrovics, the plaintiff came to the emergency room of Prince
William Hospital on October 16, 1989, complaining of sharp pain
between his shoulder blades. After an examination and administration of tests including chest x-rays, he was diagnosed as suffering
from a recurrent back pain determined not to be an emergency
condition. After plaintiff was discharged, the x-rays were sent to a
radiologist for further review. The hospital, after being notified of
an abnormality by the radiologist, called the plaintiff to return for
further tests on October 19. Plaintiff did not return and on October 22 went to Fairfax Hospital where he was diagnosed as having
pneumonia. Subsequently, plaintiff alleged that the hospital did
not provide an adequate medical screening examination and failed
to properly stabilize him before discharge as required by
COBRA.64
Evaluating plaintiff's claim, the court found that Prince William
Hospital did not violate its duties under the Act.65 The court noted
that the Act requires hospitals to perform an appropriate medical
screening." Citing a recent Sixth Circuit case,6" the court held that
the hospital provided plaintiff an appropriate medical screening
since it performed the same procedures on plaintiff as it would
have on any other patient. Since an emergency condition was not
detected, the hospital could not be responsible for failing to stabilize a known emergency condition.'
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, in a
case decided on August 28, 1992,9 ruled that the Virginia limit of
62. Id.
63. 764 F. Supp. 415 (E.D. Va. 1991).
64. Id. at 416.
65. Id. at 417.
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1988).
67. Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 1990). In
Cleland, the court found that "under the circumstances of the [A]ct, 'appropriate' can be
taken to mean care similar to care that would have been provided to any other patient, or at
least not known by the providers to be insufficient or below their own standards." Id.
68. Petrovics, 764 F. Supp. at 418. The court also noted that at the time of discharge, the
plaintiff's condition was not worsening. Therefore, to Prince William Hospital, plaintiff was
stable.
69. Power v. Arlington Hospital, No. 92-0005-A, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13611 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 28, 1992).
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one million dollars on damages for medical malpractice" does not
apply to a claim under COBRA. The court allowed plaintiff to
state a COBRA claim for one hundred eighty million dollars for a
hospital's failure to diagnose septic shock when plaintiff was
presented to its emergency room. 1 The court ruled that plaintiff
was entitled to recover those damages allowed under state law but
that she was not limited to the statutory ceiling on recovery.7 2
These cases clearly demonstrate a broad construction of COBRA. These cases send a forceful message to hospitals in the Commonwealth that they must provide medical screening and stabilize
or transfer individuals, including the uninsured, whether they originally come to the emergency room or elsewhere. Indeed, the decision in Smith7 3 indicates a level of sensitivity to this issue in the
courts that may result in a significant expansion of hospital
liability.
IV.

HOSPITAL/MEDICAL STAFF RELATIONS

The relationship between hospitals and medical staffs continues
to become more complex with the proliferation of managed care
plans, ratcheting down of payment by insurers and more intense
competition among all health care providers. Nowhere is this more
visible than in the area of credentialing of physicians for privileges
on the hospital medical staff. The concept of "economic credentialing" is a major topic of discussion in health care literature and,
increasingly, the courts.74
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit grappled with
the antitrust implications of medical staff credentialing and allegations of "economic credentialing" in a recent case. In Oksanen v.
Page Memorial Hospital,75 the court ruled that members of a hospital medical staff are capable of (but were not in this instance
found to be) conspiring among themselves when making decisions
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
71. Power, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13611 at *5.
72. Id. at *13.
73. 243 Va. 445, 416 S.E.2d 689 (1992).
74. See Howard Larkin & Brian McCormick, "The Many Faces of Economic Credentialing," AM. MED. NEWS, July 20, 1992, at 3.
75. 912 F.2d 73 (4th Cir. 1990), superseded on reh'g, 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1991) (en
banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 973 (1992).
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which affect a physician's medical staff privileges, thereby implicating the antitrust laws.7 6
The appellant in Oksanen moved to Luray in Page County, Virginia in 1978 to practice family medicine. Rejecting an offer to
practice medicine with one of the physician defendants, Dr. Holsinger,7 appellant opened his own office as a sole practitioner. After a one year probationary period, appellant received full medical
staff privileges at Page Memorial over the objections of Dr.
Holsinger.
From 1979 to 1983, the hospital administration received numerous complaints about appellant's alleged abusive conduct toward
nurses, laboratory staff and administrative personnel." s In addition, appellant complained that his physician colleagues were performing surgeries that should have been performed elsewhere. In
response to these complaints, the hospital administrator in mid1983 requested that the medical staff investigate the situation.
Subsequently, the medical staff determined that no disciplinary
79
action was warranted.
Shortly thereafter, two additional incidents with the medical
staff allegedly occurred, after which the executive committee of the
medical staff voted to revoke appellant's staff privileges.80 However, after appellant protested, the board of trustees of the hospital voted merely to suspend appellant's privileges for two months,
followed by a one-year probationary period."'
Appellant's return to practice was not smooth and complaints
about him arose again. In mid-1984, the executive committee of
the medical staff recommended to the board that appellant's staff
privileges be revoked permanently. However, Oksanen resigned
from Page Memorial's medical staff in June 1984, prior to the
82
board's final decision.
In 1988, appellant filed a complaint alleging antitrust claims
under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 83 and asserting pendent
76. 945 F.2d at 711.
77. Id. at 696. Three other physicians and Page Memorial Hospital were also defendants
in this case.
78. Id. at 700-01.
79. Id. at 700.
80. Id. at 700-01.
81. Id. at 701.
82. Id. at 701-02.
83. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988).
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state claims for violations of the Virginia Antitrust Act, civil
con84
spiracy, tortious interference with contract and defamation.
Oksanen's section 1 antitrust claim alleged that the physician
defendants conspired among themselves and with the defendant
hospital to deprive Oksanen of his medical staff privileges and access to the hospital's ancillary facilities following his resignation
from the medical staff in 1984. Oksanen alleged that while this
conspiracy occurred under the guise of peer review it was, in fact, a
concerted effort to exclude him from the hospital medical staff and
irreparably damage his medical practice in Luray. Oksanen's section 1 claim alleged that defendants possessed monopoly power in
Page County and used that power to Oksanen's economic detriment.8 5 Oksanen also alleged that the defendants conspired to injure his trade or business in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2500.86
The district court, in a memorandum opinion, granted defendant's motion for summary judgment."s A three-judge panel of the
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded. 8 The court ruled that the defendants were
legally capable of conspiring since they constituted independent
entities. 8s The court further ruled that the trial court had not permitted sufficient discovery in order to support the grant of sum84. Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., No. 88-0166-H, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18035, at *1
(W.D. Va. June 16, 1989).
85. Oksanen, 945 F.2d at 710. Dr. Oksanen also alleged violations of the Virginia Antitrust Act, Virginia Code §§ 59.1-9.1 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1992). Oksanen's state law antitrust
claims mirror his Sherman §§ 1 and 2 claims. Id.
86. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-500 (Repl. Vol. 1988 & Cum. Supp. 1992). In order to prevail under this section of the Code, a plaintiff must prove that two or more persons combined for the purpose of wilfully and maliciously injuring plaintiff's trade or business. Plaintiff must also allege he suffered actual damage as a result of the actions of the alleged
conspirators. Plaintiff further complained that the defendants tortiously interfered with his
contractual relationships with the hospital, his patients and a local nursing home for which
he provided medical services. Cf. Allen Realty Corp. v. Holbert, 227 Va. 441, 449, 318 S.E.2d
592, 596-97 (1984).
87. No. 88-0166-H, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18035, at *1 (W.D. Va. June 16, 1989). The
extensive memorandum opinion of the District Court treated each of Oksanen's complaints
in detail. The court essentially found that notwithstanding the fact that Oksanen had not
been allowed to conduct extensive discovery, the claims failed as a matter of law because
Oksanen failed to produce sufficient evidence of a conspiracy among the individual defendants. Therefore, the court did not consider application of the intracorporate immunity doctrine. Id. at *33.
88. Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 912 F.2d 73, 74 (4th Cir. 1990), superseded on
reh'g, 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 973 (1992).
89. See id. at 77.
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mary judgment at that time.9 0 The full Fourth Circuit granted a
rehearing en banc and reversed the panel's holding thereby sustaining the dismissal of Oksanen's claims."
On rehearing, the Fourth Circuit held that Oksanen's section 1
claim must be dismissed on the basis of the intracorporate immunity doctrine.92 Because both the hospital and its medical staff
shared a unity of interest, namely upgrading the quality of patient
care, the court found that they constituted a single entity, immune
from section 1 scrutiny.9 3 Dismissing appellant's claim that the
medical staff and hospital were legally separate entities, unlike a
corporation and its officers, the court emphasized examination of
the substance, rather than the form, of the relationship between
9 4
the hospital and the medical staff during the peer review process.
Examining the relationship between the hospital and its staff, the
court concluded that the two were similar to a corporation and its
officers. By delegating authority to its medical staff to conduct
peer review, the hospital acted similarly to a corporation that delegates authority to its officers. In this way, the medical staff was
acting merely as an agent of the hospital board of trustees. The
Oksanen court concluded that such delegation of authority does
not implicate section 1 scrutiny. 5
The degree of control exercised by the hospital over the medical
staff during the peer review process was an important element in
the court's opinion that the hospital and the medical staff acted as
a single enterprise.9 6 The power of the hospital board of trustees to
modify the decisions of the medical staff was significant to the
90. See id. at 79.
91. 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 973 (1992).
92. See id. at 703.
93. See id. at 706. The intracorporate immunity doctrine was articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752
(1984). Copperweld noted that unilateral actions of a single enterprise are immune from § 1
scrutiny, despite any corresponding restraint on trade. Id. at 767. To give an example of
unilateral conduct, the Copperweld court expressed that "[t]he officers of a single firm are
not separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests, so agreements among
them do not suddenly bring together economic power that was previously pursuing divergent goals." Id. at 769.
94. Oksanen, 945 F.2d at 703.
95. Id. The court determined that since conducting peerreview does not join independent
economic forces, § 1 is not violated. Id. On the contrary, the court noted that the medical
staff was "a natural component of the hospital's management structure." Id.
96. See id. at 704. The Oksanen court pointed out "the parent corporation's ability to
exercise control over its subsidiary . . ." in Copperweld influenced the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision that the two entities were a single enterprise. Id.
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court in determining that the revocation of Oksanen's privileges
97
was the product of a single enterprise, not two distinct entities.
A limited exception to the intracorporate immunity doctrine
does exist.98 Under the exception, a corporation can conspire with
its officers or agents "when the officer has an independent personal
stake in achieving the corporation's illegal objective." 99 However, if
the officer with the independent interest possesses no significant
degree of control over the decision-making process, then no antitrust concerns are raised. 00 Since the members of the medical staff
in Oksanen had only indirect economic interests and the board of
trustees retained authority over medical staff decisions, the Fourth
Circuit declined to invoke the "personal stake" exception. 101
Evaluating the "restraint of trade" portion of section 1 analysis,
the court emphasized that hospitals would not typically conspire to
restrain the number of physicians since their interests would be
inhibited. 10 2 Since hospitals have incentive to increase the number
of admissions and physicians ultimately control where their patients are admitted, hospitals would want to increase the number
of physicians with staff privileges. 03 Because Page Memorial suffered a decrease in admissions during the 1980s, it would not have
had the incentive to revoke Oksanen's staff privileges without good
04
reason.1
Although acknowledging that individual members of a medical
staff have the capacity to conspire among themselves, 0 5 the court
found no evidence that Page Memorial's medical staff conspired to
oust Oksanen. 0 6 Rejecting appellant's suggestion that the medical
97. See id.
98. See Greenville Pub. Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 1974).
99. Id.
100. Oksanen, 945 F.2d at 705; see PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1471d, g (1986).
101. Oksanen, 945 F.2d at 705-06.
102. Id. at 704.
103. See id. This analysis is countered by those who caution against the judicial sanctioning of "economic credentialing." Some might argue that a hospital medical staff could be
motivated to exclude new physicians who will compete with established physicians for market share. A hospital board could be urged to acquiesce in this plan to maintain good relations with established members of the medical staff who account for a significant volume of
admissions.
104. See id.
105. See Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605, 614 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding
that in certain circumstances the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine "does not preclude a
conspiracy among individual members of the medical staff").
106. Oksanen, 945 F.2d at 706.
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staff's action against him through peer review proceedings demonstrated the existence of a conspiracy, the court opined that "mere
contacts and communications, or the mere opportunity to conspire
. . .is insufficient evidence from which to infer an antitrust con107
spiracy in the context of the denial of hospital . . . privileges.
The court noted that the claimant must produce evidence that the
medical staff made a conscious effort to coerce the hospital into
accepting its recommendation.'0 8 The court found no such proof in
this case. 10
Appellant also contended that defendants violated section 1 of
the Sherman Act 10 when they allegedly monopolized and conspired to monopolize the health care market in Page County. 1 '
The court noted that the appellant failed to provide evidence that
Page County was the relevant market allegedly monopolized by defendants, especially since appellant referred a large number of patients to hospitals outside of Page County.
Even if appellant could prove the existence of monopoly power,
the court concluded that he would be unable to demonstrate that
the hospital willfully acquired or sought to maintain such power
since the hospital had legitimate reasons for revoking appellant's
staff privileges." 2 Finally, the court summarily dismissed appellant's pendent state law claims." 3
The Fourth Circuit's reluctance to apply antitrust scrutiny to
medical staff peer review decisions reveals its willingness to allow
hospitals discretion in promoting the quality of patient care. This
decision surely relieves Virginia hospitals conducting peer review
proceedings. However, the Fourth Circuit did point out that mem107. Id. (quoting Cooper v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., 789 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir.
1986)).
108. Id. at 706.
109. The court noted that the conduct at issue was legitimate and fair. Under the law,
peer review proceedings are mandatory. In addition, the medical staff initially shied away
from taking formal disciplinary action against appellant. The court also rejected appellant's
contention that the defendants conspired against him outside of the peer review process. Id.
at 706-07,
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1986).
111. Section 1 prohibits the acquisition of monopoly power and the use of such power to
the detriment of competitors. Usually examined under a "rule of reason" standard, the analysis must consider any pro-competitive benefits and conduct undertaken for legitimate business reasons. Oksanen, 945 F.2d at 709.
112. Id. The court also rejected appellant's argument that the medical staff conspired
among itself and with the hospital to monopolize the medical services market. Id.
113. See id. at 710-11.
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bers of a hospital medical staff are capable of conspiring among
themselves and health care providers in the Commonwealth should
be on guard.
V.

TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS

In General Counsel Memorandum 39,862 (GCM),1 14 the Internal
Revenue Service's (IRS) Chief Counsel's Office overturned three
private letter rulings 15 which approved specific hospital-physician
joint ventures involving sale of part of the hospitals' net revenue
streams. In GCM 39,862, the IRS concluded that the transactions
it had approved in the three private letter rulings were inconsistent with the hospitals' tax exempt status under section 501(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (IRS Code)"1 ' for at least
three reasons. First, formation of a joint venture with medical staff
physicians causes the hospitals' net earnings to inure to private individuals. Second, the benefit to private individuals cannot be considered incidental to the public benefits achieved. Third, such
transactions may violate other federal laws."'
While revocation of the three private letter rulings technically
applies only to the three hospitals involved, GCM 39,862 has broad
implications. The IRS, in analyzing the three letter rulings, rejected certain justifications which the hospitals had relied on in
structuring joint venture arrangements. The analysis proffered in
GCM 39,862 applies to all joint ventures and physician incentive
arrangements in which tax exempt hospitals participate.
114. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991), reprintedin 1991 IRS GCM LEXIS 39. A
general counsel memorandum outlines legal advice from the IRS Chief Counsel to another
official in the IRS. Although GCMs do not have precedential value, they do represent the
IRS National Office's legal position on certain issues.
115. Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 89-20-093, 89-42-099, and an unpublished 1984 ruling. A LTR stands
for "private letter ruling;" issued by the IRS National Office. It applies the law to a specific
factual situation at the request of a specific taxpayer. Although important, these letter rulings do not bind the IRS in dealings with other taxpayers.
116. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)(1988) ("Corporations, and any community chest, fund or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for . . . charitable, scientific . . . purposes ...
no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual ....
").
117. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991), reprinted in 1991 IRS GCM LEXIS 39, at
*1.
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The Three Private Letter Rulings

In a 1984 unpublished letter ruling, the IRS issued a favorable
ruling to a tax-exempt nonprofit hospital proposing to sell its net
revenue stream from the operation of certain outpatient departments. In an effort to increase utilization of certain outpatient facilities, the hospital proposed to establish a for-profit stock corporation which would be jointly owned, in equal shares, by the
hospitals and physicians on staff. The new corporation would serve
as general partner in four limited partnerships formed specifically
to allow medical staff physicians to participate in the operation of
four hospital outpatient departments. 118
Under the proposal, the hospital would lease outpatient departments to the limited partnerships for a stated period of time. In
turn, the limited partnerships would pay the hospital a fixed price,
discounted to present value, for the revenue stream of each department.' 19 Because the physician-investors shared profits above the
level already received by the hospital, they would only benefit if
utilization of the specific outpatient departments increased.
The arrangement provided that although fifty percent of each
limited partnership would be held by the corporation and fifty percent would be sold to the physicians, the hospital would retain actual control of the outpatient facilities through a management
agreement. 12 0 To justify this proposed transaction, the hospital
cited its need to increase utilization of its existing facilities and to
elevate quality of service while keeping costs low. 21 It reasoned
that approving the transactions would allow it to further its charitable purposes by creating incentives for medical staff physicians
to increase admissions and referrals to other departments.
In the second ruling, private letter ruling 88-20-093, the structure of the transaction was slightly different. There, a tax-exempt
118. Id. at *9.The outpatient departments involved were surgery, diagnostic (CT scan,
ultrasound, etc.), ophthalmology and cardiac nuclear medicine. Aggregated, these departments represented roughly 4% of the hospital's gross revenues.
119. Id. at *10. The limited partnerships would also pay the hospital a fee for managing
the departments and reimburse the hospital for all fixed and variable costs incurred in operating the departments. Id.
120. Id. In addition, the hospital would set the rates for patients utilizing those specific
outpatient facilities.
121. Id. at *11. The hospital faced competition from two hospitals, one for profit and the
other not-for-profit. Also, a private physician was planning to establish freestanding outpatient facilities that would be owned jointly with other physicians. Id.

780

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:759

hospital subsidiary formed a limited partnership in which it held
ten percent as a general partner and forty percent as a limited
partner.' 2 2 Medical staff physicians were also limited partners who
initially held the remaining fifty percent of the limited
123
partnership.
The limited partnership planned to purchase the net revenue
stream of the hospital's outpatient surgery program and gastroenterology laboratory. 124 The revenues originally were bought for a
term of five years with an option to extend the contract for an
additional five years. 2 5 According to the hospital subsidiary, the
purchase price for the revenue stream was agreed upon after arm's
26
length negotiations.
The hospital continued to own and operate the medical facilities
under its license and' to determine the fees charged to patients.
Each quarter, the hospital paid net revenue from operation of the
facilities to the limited partnership. The hospital rationalized that
this structure encouraged physicians to increase usage of the
facilities.
In the third ruling, private letter ruling 98-42-099, a hospital
proposed to form a limited partnership with JV Corp., a joint venture planning entity. 12 The hospital and JV Corp. planned to
serve as general partners. 2 8 The hospital and medical staff physicians together would hold ninety-nine percent of the limited partnership, 2 " although the hospital alone would have a fifty percent
share. Ownership interests and partnership allocations would be
122. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-20-093 (Feb. 26, 1988). The hospital donated to the subsidiary
funds to purchase its interest in the limited partnership and to establish a loss reserve.
123. Id. Ultimately, the physicians may have held ninety percent of the limited
partnership.
124. Id
125. Id. The option could be exercised by a fifty-one percent vote of the physicians' limited partner interest.
126. This price was fixed at fair market value and discounted to present value. Id.
127. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-42-099 (July 28, 1989). The joint venture entity was owned equally
by the hospital and its medical staff. JV Corp. planned to serve as the managing partner for
the limited partnership.
128. Id. Jointly, the general partners would own only one percent of the limited
partnership.
129. Id. Limited partnerships would be purchased only by general partners and sold to
licensed physicians who were both members of the hospital's medical staff and shareholders
in JV Corp. All physicians on the hospital medical staff would be eligible to invest in the
limited partnership and would be required to invest a minimum of five thousand dollars.
According to the hospital, the minimum investment requirement would save "each investor
a substantial risk of loss." Id.

1992]

HEALTH CARE LAW

based only on capital accounts, rather than on patient referrals to
the hospital. Like the hospital subsidiary in the second letter ruling, this hospital planned to operate the outpatient surgery facility
under its license.
Under the agreement, the limited partnership would obtain a
nonexclusive right to use the outpatient surgery facility and equipment. In addition, the limited partnership would acquire the gross
revenue stream generated from operation of the facilities.13 0 The
agreement initially covered a term of five years, and included an
option to extend the deal for an additional five years. 31 The contract provided for the hospital to pay the limited partnership adjusted gross revenues earned by the outpatient surgery program
each quarter. In turn, the limited partnership agreed to pay the
hospital on a quarterly basis for operating the facility.
B.

The Legal Analysis

The use of joint venture arrangements has increased dramatically due to the shift in governmental policy away from regulatory
cost controls toward encouraging competition among health care
providers. Since many medical and surgical procedures which were
formerly performed on an inpatient basis can now be done in an
outpatient clinic, physicians are increasingly able to compete with
hospitals for certain types of services. In addition, the federal
Medicare program has shifted from cost-based reimbursement to
fixed, per-case, prospective payments for inpatient care. Finally,
the number of inpatient admissions and the average length of stay
have declined significantly. These changes have left hospitals
searching for ways to increase patient admissions and to identify
alternate sources of revenue and capital."3 2
Joint venture arrangements provide one mechanism for achieving some of these goals.
Despite the many justifications offered by hospitals for forming
joint venture arrangements, the IRS is still strictly scrutinizing
transactions in which charitable organizations and private individ130. Id. The gross revenue stream acquired did not include bad debts or contractual allowances and excluded the physician's professional fees.
131. Id. The option could be exercised by JV Corp.
132. Id. While a diagnosis-related prospective payment system (PPS) provides strong incentives to decrease the length of patients' hospital stays and controls the cost of each patient's care, it creates incentive to increase admissions.
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uals jointly participate. In reviewing the three private letter rulings
discussed previously, the IRS concluded that they jeopardized a
hospital's tax exempt status for three reasons. Each of these reasons will be discussed in turn.
1. Private Inurement
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code defines a charitable organization as one in which "no part of the net earnings...
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual."1' "
The regulations accompanying section 501(c)(3) state that a hospital is not operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes if
any part of its net earnings inures to the benefit of private shareholders. A "private shareholder or individual" is defined as a "person . . . having a personal and private interest in the activities of
the organization,"' 34 and is commonly referred to as an
"insider."' 5
In a 1986 ruling, 38 the IRS emphasized that medical staff physicians are subject to the inurement prohibition. According to that
decision, staff physicians have close working relationships with
hospitals'3 7 and may control the flow of patients to and away from
the facility. In addition, they impact the level of patient utilization
of hospital services. Consequently, once a joint venture commences, each physician-investor becomes an "insider."
Although physicians are subject to the inurement proscription,
financial transactions are still permitted between the doctors and
the hospital. For example, physicians may be paid reasonable compensation for services provided. 3 s The proscription is designed to
eliminate "dividend-like distributions" of charitable assets to benefit a private interest.' s9 Such arrangements will destroy a hospi133. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986 & Supp. 1992).
134. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-42-099 at § 1.501(a)-1(C).
135. See American Campaign Academy v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1066 (1989).
136. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498 (Apr. 24, 1986).
137. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
138. See Birmingham Business College, Inc. v. Comm'r, 276 F.2d 476, 480 (5th Cir. 1960)
(while the payment of reasonable compensation did not constitute earnings inuring to the
benefit of those who created a tax exempt organization, use of compensation to insure an
equal distribution of earnings to the shareholders did constitute an inurement); Mabee Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 203 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1953) (payment of reasonable salaries
to corporate officers did not constitute inurement of net corporate assets; however, excessive
and unreasonable salaries would constitute an inurement).
139. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
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tal's exemption if they are "merely a device for distributing profits
1 40
to persons in control.
The inurement prohibition applies not only to a hospital's net
earnings but also to any of its charitable assets.1 4 ' Likewise, net
earnings may inure to a private individual in ways other than the
distribution of dividends. 4 2 In addition,
even small amounts may
43
violate the inurement prohibition.
In assessing the three private letter rulings, the IRS suggested
that the proper starting point in the analysis is to determine
whether the transaction furthers the hospital's exempt purposes. 4 4
Finding no expansion of health care resources and no creation of
new providers, the IRS concluded that the transactions did not
further charitable purposes.145 Instead, the IRS hypothesized that
the hospitals engaged in these joint ventures in order to financially
reward and retain medical staff physicians, to increase admissions
and referrals, and to prevent the creation of competing services by
physicians.'M Finding that giving or selling medical staff physicians a proprietary interest in the net profits of a hospital is indistinguishable from paying dividends on stock, the IRS concluded
that the arrangements per se violated the inurement prohibition of
section 501(c)(3).14
2.

Private Benefit

Tax exempt organizations must serve a public rather than a private interest. 4 8 Unlike the inurement proscription which applies
only to "insiders," the private benefit prohibition extends to all
persons and groups. 49 In addition, while the private inurement
prohibition is absolute, 5 0 the private benefit prohibition is not ap140. Id.
141. See Harding Hasp., Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir. 1974).
142. Id.
143. See Spokane Motorcycle Club v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 151 (E.D. Wash. 1963).
144. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. Under certain conditions, hospitals may develop incentive compensation plans in
which profits are a factor. Id.
148. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii) (1990).
149. Id.
150. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2).
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plied where the private benefit is incidental to the public benefit
conferred. 151
The prohibitions against inurement and private benefit are separate and distinct. While the presence of private inurement violates
both proscriptions, the absence of inurement does not signify the
absence of private benefit.'52 This distinction is important because
even if a hospital has been cleared of violating the inurement prohibition, the IRS will still apply the private benefit test to the
transaction at issue.
The presence of a single substantial noncharitable purpose constitutes private benefit and will destroy exemption even if greatly
outnumbered by charitable purposes. 153 A balancing test is employed to determine the existence of a substantial noncharitable
purpose."" According to the IRS, the prohibition is not violated as
long as the private benefit is incidental in both a qualitative and
quantitative sense to the overall benefit.'55 The private benefit is
balanced only against the public benefit, not the overall good accomplished by the organization.
Private benefits conferred on physician-investors by the revenue
stream from joint ventures are not incidental, but are direct and
substantial. In support of this proposition, the IRS noted that the
public benefits expected from these transactions, namely better financial health or greater efficiency, only tenuously relate to hospitals' charitable purposes of promoting community health. The IRS
stated that while increased referrals or prevention of new competition may enhance the competitive position of a specific hospital, it
does not necessarily further charitable goals. 5 '
In addition to analyzing the sale of revenue streams, in GCM
39,862 the IRS also addressed the joint venture aspect of these
transactions. Noting that this aspect of the law has changed significantly over the last decade, the IRS asserted that it no longer as151. See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii). For a discussion of a situation in which more than
incidental private benefit was involved, see Sonora Community Hosp. v. Commissioner, 46
T.C. 519 (1966), aff'd, 397 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1968).
152. See American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
153. See Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945).
154. For a discussion of the standard, see Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. 18, 1978).
155. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991). Noting that "some private benefit is present in all typical hospital physician relationships," the IRS has concluded that "[t]he private benefit accruing to physicians generally can be considered incidental to the overwhelming public benefit."
156. Id.
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sumes that participation as a general partner in a partnership is
per se incompatible with exemption. Instead, when private, taxable
parties are involved, the IRS will scrutinize the transaction for private inurement or private benefit using a "careful scrutiny" standard of review. 157 In order to pass muster, the joint venture organization must further a charitable purpose and must only
incidentally benefit the partner if at all.
Applying the close scrutiny standard, the IRS concluded that
the partnerships at issue do not serve charitable purposes. The
IRS reasoned that the partnership's only function is to purchase,
receive and distribute the net revenue stream, not further a charitable end. Thus, the arrangements failed the first step of the close
scrutiny standard. Even if the joint ventures crossed the first hurdle, they would stumble over the second because the arrangements
benefit the private interests of the physicians too greatly to be
158
incidental.
3.

Federal Law Violations

Since almost every exempt hospital described in section
501(c)(3) participates in the Medicare and Medicaid programs, almost all hospitals are subject to the Social Security Act. Especially
significant is the anti-kickback statute, a portion of the Medicare
and Medicaid anti-fraud and abuse law. 5 e The anti-kickback statute prohibits the offer, solicitation, payment or receipt of any remuneration in return for, or to induce, the referral of a patient for
any service that may be paid for by Medicare or Medicaid.' 60 How
the statute applies to hospital physician joint ventures has yet to*
be firmly established. A hospital violating this prohibition may
jeopardize its exemption.
The Secretary of HHS has published regulations which specify
payment practices that do not violate the anti-kickback statute.' 6 '
The safe harbor regulations protect only a few existing practices
that meet very precise standards and are clearly non-abusive. It
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
monly

Id.
Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1988 & Supp. H 1990).
Id.
56 Fed. Reg. 35952 (July 19, 1991) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001). These are comreferred to as the "safe harbor regulations."
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covers investments in larger publicly traded entities1 62 and certain
active and passive investments in small entities.163 The investments at issue here were not covered and would have to meet the
eight standards to be protected. The arrangements failed to satisfy
the standards."I
Regarding the arrangements at hand, the IRS concluded that engaging in any conduct violative of the anti-kickback statute was
incompatible with charitable exemption status. Specifically, the
IRS intimated that the physician-hospital arrangements were not
true joint ventures, but shams.16 5 A valid business purpose is necessary to avoid fraud and abuse problems in joint ventures. 6 Joint
ventures amount to a sham when they are created to pass an economic benefit in exchange for referrals,6 7 and absence of mutual
risk generally indicates a sham operation. 68
Lack of symmetry in upside opportunities and downside risks
for physician investors makes the arrangements at issue suspect.
The arrangements characterize a great potential for reward, but
little downside risk for the physicians. Instead, most of the risk
was borne by the general partners. The IRS suggested that just
having the opportunity to invest in such a profitable venture to
which the physician would be referring patients could be reviewed
as illegal remuneration in violation of the anti-kickback statute.'69
The IRS, however, declined to specifically rule on this issue.
VI.

HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT

The 1992 General Assembly session continued to address the
rights of individuals to make decisions to have medical treatment
withheld in certain cases. Virginia, like many states, adopted
"right-to-die" legislation in the 1980s to empower individuals suffering from "terminal illnesses," or persons in a "persistent vegetative state," to order that certain medical care be withheld or with162. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a)(1). Application is restricted to publicly traded investments in
entities having undepreciated net tangible assets exceeding $50 million.
163. Id. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a)(2) for a list of the standards.
164. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
165. See OIG Special Fraud Alert: "Joint Venture Arrangements," [1990 Transfer
Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 38,448, at 22,519 (Apr. 1989).

166. Id.
167. Sanford Teplitzky, Avoiding Fraud and Abuse Problems in Joint Ventures, 4
HealthSpan 17 (Jan. 1987).

168. Id.
169. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
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drawn. 17 0 In addition to the Natural Death Act, two other sections

of the Code, section 37.1-134.4 and sections 11-9.1 and -9.2, dealt
with various aspects of advance decisionmaking through the appointment of surrogate decisionmakers.17' This patchwork of legis-

lation created some Confusion and led to different approaches to
planning for incapacity.
The Health Care Decisions Act 72 creates a single "advance directive" statute thus eliminating the inconsistencies between the
Natural Death Act and Code section 37-1.-134.4173 relating to persons who may consent to treatment for individuals incapable of
consenting for themselves at the time.17 4 The impetus for the
Health Care Decisions Act derived, in part, from the Federal Patient Self-Determination Act 175 which requires:

(1) hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, home health agencies, hospice programs, and HMOs which participate in Medicare and Medicaid programs to inform patients of their rights under state law to
make treatment decisions;
(2) health care providers to educate staff and the community
about advance directives;
170. See Natural Death Act of Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2981 to -2993 (Repl. Vol.
1991 & Curn. Supp. 1992), originally adopted in 1983. The 1991 version of this Act defined
"terminal condition" as "a condition caused by injury, disease or illness from which, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, (i) there can be no recovery and (ii) death is imminent." Id. § 54.1-2982 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
171. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4 (Repl. Vol. 1990) (repealed), 11-9.1, -9.2 (Repl. Vol.
1989). Former § 37.1-134.4 created a statutory alternative to the Natural Death Act and
common law for the appointment of surrogate decisionmakers. It provided that if a physician determined that "[b]ecause of mental illness, mental retardation, or any other mental
disorder, or a physical disorder which precludes communication or impairs judgment, [a
patient] is incapable of making an informed decision about providing, withholding or withdrawing a specific medical treatment or course of treatment. . .," the physician could rely
upon the instructions of a surrogate decisionmaker. Id. § 37.1-134.4 (Repl. Vol. 1990). The
classes of surrogate decisionmakers, and their priorities, were set forth in the statute. Sections 11-9.1 and -9.2 permit the creation of so-called "durable" powers of attorney which are
designed to survive the incapacity of the principal. Id. §§ 11-9.1, -9.2 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
172. Act of Apr. 5, 1992, ch. 772, 1992 Va. Acts 1200 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.12981 to 2993 (Cum. Supp. 1992). The Health Care Decisions Act replaces the Natural Death
Act.
173. Section 37.1-134.4 was repealed. Acts of Apr. 5, 1992, chs. 748, 772, 1992 Va. Acts
1144, 1200.
174. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2987.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
175. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 1388-115 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395cc(a)(1)(Q), 1395 cc(f) (Supp. II 1990)).
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(3) states to establish a written description of the state's law concerning advance directives for distribution by providers; and
to develop and
(4) the Secretary of Health and Human Services
18
implement a nationwide education' campaign. 7
The Health Care Decisions Act expands the options for the form
of the advance directive by adding a durable power of attorney
provision to the living will choice. 177 Under the new provision, an
agent may be appointed to make health care decisions, as provided
in the written advance directive, for declarants determined to be
incapable of making an informed decision. 1 71 If the agent cannot
determine which treatment the declarant would have chosen, the
agent is authorized to make a decision based upon the best interest
of the patient. 179 The agent's authority is effective as long as the
declarant is incapable of making an informed decision. 8 0
In the absence of an advance directive, the procedure differs. In
this situation, an attending physician may either provide, withhold, or withdraw medical treatment from a patient incapable of
making an informed decision upon the authorization of persons in
a specified order of priority.' 8 ' The physician, however, still has
some flexibility. If the physician knows that the course of treatment authorized by the specified individuals is protested by the
patient, the physician is not compelled to provide it.' 8 2 As part of
the new statute, the specified persons must make the medical
treatment decision based upon guidelines set out by the Act. 8 ' No
person or facility treating a patient with proper authorization will
incur liability for any claim based on lack of consent or authorization for such treatment. 84 Likewise, persons authorizing treatment
in accordance with the Act will not be subject to criminal prosecution, civil liability or liability for the cost of treatment.8 5
By combining the Natural Death Act and section 37.1-134.4 of
the Code, the General Assembly eliminated inconsistencies regard176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2984 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 54.1-2986(A).
Id. § 54.1-2986(C).
See id. § 54.1-2986(A).
Id. § 54.1-2988.
Id.
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ing authorization for treatment of individuals incapable of consenting for themselves. Under the former Natural Death Act, only
those competent adults diagnosed as having a terminal condition
could make a written or oral declaration. In 1989, the General Assembly revised the Natural Death Act to permit those declarants
terminally ill or unable to make or communicate a decision to designate a person to make treatment "decisions for them.186 The "substituted consent" statute, however, did not require the individual
87
to have a terminal illness.1
Finally, the Health Care Decisions Act incorporates a new provision allowing emergency medical services personnel to follow
Emergency Medical Services "Do Not Resuscitate Orders" s in the
pre-hospital setting. 89 The "Do Not Resuscitate Order" itself is a
written physician's order, validated by a form or bracelet approved
by the Board of Health, which authorizes qualified emergency
medical service personnel to withhold cardiopulmonary resuscitation from adult patients in the event of cardiac or respiratory arrest.'-" The order, however, does not authorize the withholding of
other medical interventions, such as intravenous fluids, oxygen or
other therapies necessary to provide comfort, care, or to alleviate
19
pain.
VII.

FRAUD AND ABUSE DEVELOPMENTS

Like the other areas of health law, the past year saw significant
activity with respect to fraud and abuse. 9 ' This past year alone,
186. Act of March 25, 1989, ch. 592, 1989 Va. Acts 892, 893 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
54.1-2981 to -2992 (Repl. Vol. 1991)).
187. This provision was outlined in the now repealed VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4 (Repl.
Vol. 1990). See supra note 173.
188. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2987.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
189. Emergency medical personnel are not authorized to follow such orders if the patient
is able to and does express to such personnel a desire to be resuscitated prior to cardiac or
respiratory arrest. Id.
. 190. Id. § 54.1-2982. The term "cardiopulmonary resuscitation" is defined to include cardiac compression, endotracheal intubation and other advanced airway management, artificial ventilation, and defibrillation and related procedures. Id.
191. Id.
192. The federal Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse law also referred to as the antikickback statute, is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (1988 & Supp. II 1990). Virginia also
has a series of similar state laws which address fraud and abuse issues. Section 32.1-315
prohibits the knowing and willful solicitation, receipt, offer or payment of remuneration in
return for referring a person for an item or service paid for under the Commonwealth's
Medicaid program. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-315 (Repl. Vol. 1992). Two statutes prohibit the
knowing and willful offer or payment of remuneration by a hospital or institution for the
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final fraud and abuse safe harbor regulations were promulgated, a
fraud alert and a management advisory report were issued by the
HHS Office of the Inspector General, and the first administrative
exclusion case under the fraud and abuse law was prosecuted.
These recent events have fueled the concerns of health care providers about both the reach and the impact of the statute.
Federal fraud and abuse law broadly prohibits the offer or receipt of remuneration, directly or indirectly, in cash or in kind, for
the purpose of inducing referrals for items or services paid for by
Medicare or Medicaid programs. 9 3 Remuneration is not limited to
cash bribes or kickbacks; rather, remuneration includes forgiveness
of indebtedness, reduced rent, in-kind payments, free services, or
any other item or service of value.' 94
Federal courts have construed this statute broadly, finding that
if one purpose of remuneration paid to a health care provider is to
induce a referral, the statute has been violated, regardless of
whether valuable items or services were provided in return for the
remuneration.195 Because of the breadth with which the judiciary
has interpreted the statute, Congress directed the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to promulgate safe harbor regulations
to define certain conduct which would not be. subject to prosecutidn under the statute. 19 The final safe harbor regulations, 97 pubmentally ill to induce any practitioner of the healing arts to refer ahy individual (not just
Medicare or Medicaid recipients) to the facility. Id. §§ 32.1-135.2, 37.1-186.1. A separate
statute prohibits the solicitation or receipt of such remuneration by a physician. Id. § 54.12962.1. Another statute prohibits the sharing of fees between referring physicians. Id. §
54.1-2962.
193. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1988).
194. United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 71-72 (3d Cir. 1985).
195. Greber, 760 F.2d 68; see also United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Bay State Ambulance, 874 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989).
196. Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-93,
§ 14(a), 101 Stat. 697 (1987) provides:
(a) Regulations. The Secretary of Health and Human Services, in consultation with
the Attorney General, not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this
Act [enacted Aug. 18, 1987] shall publish proposed regulations, and not later than
two years after the date of the enactment of this Act [enacted Aug. 18, 1987] shall
promulgate final regulations, specifying payment practices that shall not be treated as
a criminal offense under § 1128B(b) of the Social Security Act and shall not serve as
the basis for an exclusion under § 1128(b)(7) of such Act. Any practices specified in
regulations pursuant to the preceding sentence shall be in addition to the practices
described in subparagraphs (A)-(C) of § 1128B(b)(3).
Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b).
197. Proposed regulations were published in December 1988 and quickly withdrawn. The
proposed safe harbors were again published in January 1989. 54 Fed. Reg. 3088 (1989).
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lished on July 29, 1991 by the Department of Health and Human
Services Office of the Inspector General (OIG), 19 8 define eleven
types of arrangements which will not be considered abusive if
strict criteria are met. 19 To qualify for safe harbor protection, a
provider must meet each criterion of every applicable safe harbor.
The failure to comply with a safe harbor does not necessarily
establish a violation of the statute. The preamble to the final safe
harbor regulations states that the failure of a transaction to fall
within one of the eleven safe harbors could mean one of three
things: (1) the conduct is not illegal and thus is not proscribed by
the statute, (2) the conduct constitutes a clear violation of the statute and does not qualify for safe harbor protection or (3) the conduct may violate the statute in a less serious manner such that the
OIG would exercise its prosecutorial discretion and not prosecute
the provider.0 0
Many commentators have predicted that the publication of the
safe harbor regulations will usher in an era of heightened administrative prosecution by the OIG. One very visible example of this
potential is the OIG's administrative sanction action in the case of
Hanlester Network.20 '
The Hanlester case involved a clinical laboratory joint venture
arrangement in which physician-investors were chosen specifically
for their ability to refer cases. Although investors were not required to refer patients to the entity, they were told that the failure to make such referrals would present a "blueprint for failure. ' 202 The OIG concluded that the limited partnership interests
were sold with the intention of encouraging referrals from the phy198. The OIG, a branch of the Department of Health and Human Services, is charged
with the civil enforcement of federal fraud and abuse law. The OIG, in conjunction with the
Department of Justice, enforces the criminal provisions of the statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1302,
1395hh (1988); 42 C.F.R. § 1000.10 to -.30.
199. 42 C.F.R. §§ 1001.1, 1001.951 to -.953. The regulations establish safe harbors for:
certain investment interests in both large and small entities, space rental, equipment rental,
personal services and management contracts, sale of a practice, referral services, warranties,
discounts, employment relationships, group purchasing organizations, and waiver of certain
beneficiary coinsurance and deductible amounts. A comprehensive review of the elements of
the eleven safe harbors is beyond the scope of this article.
200. 56 Fed. Reg. 35954 (1991).
201. The Hanlester Network, [1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
1 39,566, at 27,739 (Department of Health & Human Servs., Dept'l App. Bd., App. Div.
Sept. 18, 1991).
202. Id. at 27,742.
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sician limited partners. Accordingly, the OIG gave notice of exclusion from participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
The excluded parties appealed to an administrative law judge
(ALJ). The ALJ's decision rejected the OIG's interpretation of the
fraud and abuse statute. In essence, the ALJ found that payments
made to the investors were made in accordance with the terms of
the investment rather than in accordance with the number of referrals made. More specifically, the ALJ found that physician partners were not obligated to refer to the partnership laboratories.
Absent such a "quid pro quo" agreement, the ALJ refused to find
20 3
a violation of the fraud and abuse statute.
On appeal, the Health and Human Services Departmental Appeals Board (DAB) rejected the interpretation of the ALJ,holding
that "an agreement precluding provider choice" is not required to
establish a fraud and abuse violation. The DAB stated that the
term "induce" meant "to exercise influence over reason and judgment in an effort to cause a desired action."20 4 The DAB broadly
defined remuneration as a "comprehensive reference to anything of
value employed with the prescribed intent of inducing referrals."
The DAB remanded the case to the ALJ for an application of the
facts to the law.2 05
On remand, the ALJ adopted the conclusions of law enunciated
in the DAB's decision and found that all respondents had violated
the fraud and abuse statute. The ALJ excluded all of the partnerships permanently because they "could not function without referrals from their partners." The general partner was excluded for
two years to provide adequate time to divest itself of the problematic arrangements. The ALJ did not exclude the individual respondents because he found no intent to violate the law given the general state of uncertainty as to the breadth and meaning of the
fraud and abuse statute. 0 8
203. Id. at 27,743, 27,745. The ALJ did find that the marketing manager who commented
that physician referrals were a requirement of the investment had violated the statute.
However, since she had done so in disregard of the instructions of her employer and had
subsequently resigned, the ALJ found that no exclusion remedy was necessary. Id. at 27,743.
204. Id. at 27,746-47.
205. Id. at 27,751, 27,764.
206. The Hanslester Network, [New Developments] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
140,064, at 29859 (Department of Health & Human Servs., Dept'l App. Bd., Civ. Remedies
Div. Mar. 10, 1992).
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On July 24, 1992, the DAB again reversed the ALJ's decision
and concluded that all of the individual respondents should be excluded from participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs
for a period of one to two years. 7 On July 30, the Hanlester Network and the other individually named plaintiffs filed a civil complaint in federal district court seeking to stay the exclusion and
reverse the agency's prior decision.2 0 8 The complaint alleges that
the statute is being misused by the OIG to further its position,
that the HHS decisions are based on interpretations which are so
broad, indefinite and obtuse as to render the anti-kickback statute
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, that the plaintiffs could
not have knowingly and willfully violated the statute since they
did not and could not have known of the interpretation now being
applied, that the decisions were not supported by substantial evidence, and that the DAB improperly usurped the authority of the
ALJ by substituting its own judgment for that of the trier of fact.
The plaintiffs seek an injunction staying the effective date of the
exclusion until the court resolves the substantive issues raised in
the case. 20 9 Hence, at the time of this writing, the ultimate outcome of this exclusion case remains uncertain.
Although the OIG has repeatedly refused to publish advisory
opinions which would provide additional clarification with regard
to the legality of conduct under the statute, the OIG has been active in issuing fraud alerts and management advisory reports to
help define conduct that the OIG considers illegal. 210 In October of
1991, the OIG released a Management Advisory Report discussing
suspect arrangements between hospitals and hospital-based physicians.2 1 ' In this report, the OIG coricludes that hospitals are in a
position to materially influence the flow of Medicare and Medicaid
business by selecting the hospital-based physicians who will be the
recipients of the flow of business generated at the hospital. Based
on its assumption that hospitals can "refer," the OIG lists a number of suspect arrangements which it believes violates the fraud
and abuse statute.2 1 2
207. 3 Medicare Rep. (BNA) at 955 (Aug. 7, 1992).
208. The Hanlester Network v. Sullivan, No. CV-92-4552-WGR (D.C. Cal. July 30, 1992).
209. Id.
210. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35954-55, 59 (1991).
211. OIG Management Advisory Report: "Financial Arrangements Between Hospitals and
Hospital-Based Physicians," [1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Report (CCH) 1
39,044, at 25,215 (Jan. 31, 1991).
212. See id.
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Arrangements cited by the OIG include requirements that hospital-based physicians pay a percentage of their gross receipts to the
hospital's endowment fund; that hospital-based physicians be required to purchase hospital equipment and donate it to the hospital at the termination of the contract; that hospital-based physicians pay for capital improvements, services, supplies, personnel,
utilities, maintenance and billing services on a sliding-fee schedule
which increases as gross receipts increase; and requirements for
free administrative services in exchange for the opportunity to perform and bill patients directly for other services.213 While the
Management Advisory Report created significant controversy, at
present, its major impact has been on contractual relationships between hospitals and hospital-based physicians. Hospital-based
physicians appear to be increasingly relying on the Management
Advisory Report in negotiating contracts with hospitals. It remains
to be seen whether the OIG will become active in prosecuting these
types of arrangements as violations of the fraud and abuse statute.
The OIG also issued a special fraud alert on May 7, 1992 addressing hospital incentives to physicians.214 Because the OIG issued a special fraud alert describing in detail the type of arrangement prosecuted in the Hanlester case just prior to that case being
brought, many commentators believe that the special fraud alert
sends a message that the OIG will be actively seeking to prosecute
a case dealing with hospital incentives to physicians. 1 5 In the
fraud alert, the OIG identifies several incentive payment arrangements that it believes may violate the statute. The OIG condemned arrangements ranging from direct payments for admissions to income guarantees, interest-free loans, and free training
for physician's office staff.216 The OIG warns that financial incen213. Id. at 25,216.
214. OIG Special Fraud Alert, "Hospital Incentives to Physicians," May 11, 1992 (reprinted by Medicare Compliance Alert) [hereinafter "Hospital Incentive Fraud Alert"].
215. See Hanslester,[1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 39,566,
at 27,757.
216. The OIG circulated the following list of "indicators of potentially unlawful activity":
payment of any sort of incentive each time a physician refers a patient to the hospital; use
of free or significantly discounted office space or equipment; provision of free or significantly
discounted staff services; free training for physician's office staff; income guarantees; low
interest or interest-free loans, or loans which may be forgiven; payment of the cost of physician's travel and conference expenses; payment for continuing education courses; coverage
on group health insurance plan at an inappropriately low cost to the physician; payment for
services which require few if any substantive duties by the physician. Hospital Incentive
Fraud Alert, supra note 214, at 2.
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tive packages which incorporate features similar to those named in
the fraud alert may be subject to prosecution "if one of the purposes of the incentive is to influence the physician's medical decisions as to where to refer his or her patients for treatment. ' 217
The developments of the past year have created good reason for
concern by providers over the scope and meaning of fraud and
abuse law. The uncertainty regarding the scope of the statute continues as the Hanlester case winds its way through the judicial system, and the limited protection afforded by the long-awaited safe
harbor regulations provides little relief for many provider arrangements. The developments that will take place in the coming
months will be very important in assessing both the meaning and
impact of the anti-kickback statute.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

This article has provided a very brief summary of some of the
recent developments which are most likely to affect the operations
of health care providers in Virginia. Providing legal services to all
manner of health care providers continues to increase in complexity, becoming an ever more challenging endeavor.

217. Id.

